Introduction

Federal Minister Attaullah Tarar has continued in his string of falsehoods, blatantly misrepresenting my stance below strain these days. Previously, he lied approximately my son. Unluckily, this addiction seems to have taken hold of him.

From fostering lies and aligning with the establishment’s pastimes towards Nawaz Sharif to being a forefront for Imran Khan, he has constructed his politics on self-deception ever since. But that is retribution—Imran Khan is now dealing with the effects of his actions. On October 27, 2022, former DG-ISI General Nadeem Anjum, for the duration of a press conference, laid out the trajectory for the following many years in only sentences: “In January 2021, the army management determined to end up apolitical, and this choice will continue to be powerful for the following 18 years.”

In plain terms, the military leadership had already decided to part ways with Imran Khan in January 2021. The guiding principle of the establishment remains the same: “Changing governments is an institutional decision.”

During General Raheel Sharif’s tenure, the campaign to “save the state, not politics”

During General Raheel Sharif’s tenure, the campaign to “save the state, not politics” began in 2014, targeting Nawaz Sharif’s politics. Back then, the message was clear: the military leadership may change, but the stance will remain unchanged. Even though Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif himself appointed the new Army Chief, the new chief was bound to continue from where General Raheel left off. Starting in December 2021, the PML-N leadership was twice informed that General Faiz might become the next chief. Whether it was General Asim Munir, General Sahir Shamshad, or General Azhar, the decision on Imran Khan was institutional, and PML-N would merely be used in the process.

Historically

Historically, the removal of prime ministers has followed countless models, but three are particularly noteworthy. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the founder of Bangladesh, despite his power struggle with the establishment, served four years in office. However, on August 15, 1975, he and his family met a horrific end. Even if the Awami League lower back to power twenty years later, it could not establish a sturdy foothold. Today, it’s simply a historic anecdote, as Mujib’s ideology starts off evolving to resurface.

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, after his sentence, saw his party go back to a vulnerable and conditional coalition authorities under Benazir in 1988, following 12 years of compromise with the established order.

Nawaz Sharif was personally arrested by the military leadership in 1999

Nawaz Sharif was personally arrested by the military leadership in 1999 in a humiliating manner. After years of exile, he returned and regained power 14 years later. However, by April 2014, the establishment had launched its “save the state” narrative through Imran Khan, leading to another power grab. Nawaz was forced to stand as an accused with his family before Grade-19 officers, as it was the establishment’s non-negotiable decision. He faced a 10-year sentence on July 6 and later a 7-year sentence. Today, though in power, the coalition government lacks popular political support.

Explain in detail

The Evolution of the “save the kingdom, not Politics” marketing campaign

During Raheel Sharif’s tenure as the leader of military personnel (COAS) from 2013 to 2016, Pakistan witnessed one of the most tremendous army interventions in its political panorama under the pretext of countrywide security. The marketing campaign “Keep the country, not Politics” emerged in 2014, initially as a counter-narrative to Nawaz Sharif’s government. The underlying message changed into clear: whilst political leaders should exchange, the military’s stance on national protection, governance, and stability could remain unshaken.

This doctrine signaled an essential shift

This doctrine signaled an essential shift in how electricity was generated and turned into exercised behind the scenes in Pakistan. Although top Minister Nawaz Sharif, in his constitutional authority, appointed a new navy chief after General Raheel Sharif’s retirement, the coverage framework remained constant. The brand new management had to preserve executing the wider institutional agenda set in motion through the previous navy-established order.

Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N)

By December 2021, the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) leadership reportedly became informed two times that former Faiz Hameed might be considered for the top navy post. But inner dynamics caused the appointment of General Asim Munir as COAS, along with widespread Sahir Shamshad Mirza. No matter who took the helm, the military had already determined the fate of Imran Khan and his political trajectory. The PML-N and other political actors had been seen as mere gadgets on this method as opposed to an unbiased power player.

Patterns of Top Ministerial Ousters

At some point in Pakistan’s history, the military and established order have played a crucial role in the removal of high ministers. Three sizeable fashions of political ousters stand out:

1. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman – The Tragic Stop

Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the founder of Bangladesh, struggled against the Pakistani established order and won a democratic mandate in 1970. But his tenure as Bangladesh’s first top Minister resulted in bloodshed. On August 15, 1975, he and his family were brutally assassinated in a navy coup. Even after the Awami League back to strength decades later, Mujib’s ideology struggled to preserve dominance. His party stays in strength today, however capabilities in a distinctive political landscape.

2. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto – From Energy to the Gallows

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto became a charismatic leader who initially had the establishment’s support but later fell out fovr style. After his government was overthrown in 1977, he was sentenced to death and executed in 1979. His celebration, the Pakistan human beings’ birthday party (PPP), again came to power under his daughter Benazir Bhutto in 1988, however, most effectively as part of a weak coalition government under strict military oversight. The PPP’s ideological foundations, rooted in Bhutto’s anti-establishment stance, eroded through the years. In spite of forming governments three times, the celebration lost its authentic identity and became a shadow of its former self.

3. Nawaz Sharif – The Cycle of Exile and Return

Nawaz Sharif’s political profession has been marked by repeated confrontations with the established order. In 1999, he was removed in a military coup led through fashionable Pervez Musharraf and was ultimately exiled. After years of political maneuvering, he returned to energy in 2013, best to face every other systematic removal.

By using 2014, the navy establishment launched the “keep the kingdom” marketing campaign via Imran Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI). A combination of road protests, judicial interventions, and media strain created an environment where Nawaz Sharif was painted as an enemy of the nation. In 2017, he was disqualified from the workplace and later sentenced to ten years in jail. Some other 7-year sentence was observed, cementing his political downfall. Although his party has technically regained electricity via coalition arrangements, it lacks actual public support, making it quite dependent on the established order.

The destiny of the Civil Army members of the family

The ordinary pattern of army involvement in Pakistan’s political opinions suggests that any civilian government remains at risk of institutional interference. The “keep the kingdom, now not Politics” doctrine changed into not just about doing away with Nawaz Sharif; it became a broader approach to keep the navy’s supremacy over civilian rule.

Even these days, as political alliances shift and new leaders emerge, the underlying power structure remains unchanged. The fate of political figures like Imran Khan, Nawaz Sharif, and others is often dictated with the aid of institutional choices instead of democratic will. Until there’s an essential shift in civil-military relations, Pakistan’s political instability is likely to persist.

In the end, the “save the kingdom, now not Politics” marketing campaign was a calculated pass that fashioned Pakistan’s electricity dynamics for years. The elimination of top ministers has followed specific models, but the result stays the same: civilian governments battle to assert autonomy in a system where the real energy lies somewhere else.

The only successful civil-military model in Pakistan’s history remains the tenure of Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz or caretaker governments.

Given the outcomes of the last three prime ministers, how could Imran Khan’s fate differ? Sheikh Mujib faced sedition charges in the Agartala Conspiracy Case. Bhutto was implicated in the murder of Nawab Mohammad Ahmad Khan Kasuri, though his real crime was challenging the establishment. Nawaz faced charges of hijacking and undermining the institution. Imran Khan, after running a daylight campaign against the establishment, cannot expect to escape unscathed. Furthermore, the £190 million case stands as a solid, well-prepared case ready to take him down. In the UK, corruption and money laundering are tightly monitored by the National Crime Agency (NCA), which developed this case. When the NCA seized £190 million from a property tycoon for money laundering, the establishment and government linked it to Hassan Nawaz’s £18 million purchase of Avenfield properties, aiming to prove money laundering. However, they failed in the UK because the NCA was not under Shahzad Akbar’s control.

Additionally, Pakistan had to pay $70 million in compensation and fines to Broadsheet (Kaveh Moussavi), who was tasked with uncovering illegal assets owned by Nawaz Sharif and his sons.

The fee was made despite Broadsheet’s futile efforts. Interestingly, a British court fined Kaveh Moussavi for falsely accusing Nawaz’s sons of owning illegal property and wasting the court’s time.

As compared to Mujib, Bhutto, and Nawaz, Imran Khan is lucky. When he changed into a targeted, well-known Bajwa’s sick rationale supported him for a year and a half. Later, the establishment’s top-notch incompetence and shortage of approach raised his politics, which had been in decline, to new heights. These days, Imran Khan’s recognition owes itself to the establishment’s malevolence and inefficiency. The establishment’s supportive method gave him political energy and recognition.

 Reflecting on this, it’s chilling to think the real game against Imran Khan by the establishment hasn’t even begun yet.

The third round of negotiations between PTI and the government starts today. Despite the ups and downs, outcomes seem predetermined, with Imran Khan’s approval and desire evident in the process. A pertinent question arises: why did Imran Khan waste three years securing this leniency or negotiation? This political shortsightedness cost him dearly, as a better deal was possible three years ago with far less damage

PTI’s anger over Imran Khan’s convictions has no connection to General Asim Munir; it’s an institutional decision. General Bajwa and General Faiz would have done far worse. The negotiations only aim to finalize the arrangements for Imran Khan’s political demise.

A side note:

The case against the Army Act is under hearing in the Supreme Court. Any experimentation here seems unlikely. Regardless of how much the state resorts to lies, convictions through military courts won’t harm Imran Khan or PTI; they will benefit instead. These tactics have been tried before, always yielding zero results. Recently, the Supreme Court held over a dozen hearings. Interestingly, it was revealed in a lighthearted moment that the Ministry of Defense is not subordinate to the Government of Pakistan, and its lawyer doesn’t represent the federal government.